This article contributes to 'sociology of professions' theory through the study of changes that occurred in US airline pilots' work. Findings reveal that airline pilots are quasi-professional experts who developed specialized skills based on talent and experience which allowed them to work autonomously and enjoy a correspondingly high sense of trust and prestige for which they were often well compensated. However, results of this study suggest high labour costs and weak professional communities leave quasi-professional experts vulnerable to managerial cost-cutting and work intensification agendas, particularly during periods of merger, downsizing and other forms of industry restructuring. Findings signal a deprofessionalization of some elite fields in which experts' specialized skills become devalued and the industry-specific nature of their expertise reduces career options and job mobility. Although the present study identifies this trend in aviation, recent changes in a wide range of industries from healthcare to high-tech portend applicability in a variety of domains.
Introduction
Much has changed in corporate America in the troubling first decade of the 21st century, challenging workers to adjust. One area of intense transformation has been in US commercial piloting where airline bankruptcy, merger and industry restructuring after 11 advanced education and enforced by professional communities with ethical norms such as physicians' Hippocratic Oath and lawyers' bar association (Braverman, 1974; Crompton and Jones, 1984) . As such, professions are defined as a form of work which is accomplished by extensively educated, highly-skilled people in a defined area of study based on an established theoretical foundation who typical belong to membership organizations and work autonomously within the standards established by an accrediting agency or regulatory body. To achieve professional status, Millerson (1964) notes, there must be recognition of the field's competence by both its members and the general public. However, findings in the present study reveal that post-9/11 pilots do not fit neatly into previous sociology of professions definitions of occupation or profession, but rather encompass some aspects of both categories (see Figure 1 ). For instance, similar to many occupations, pilots are skilled in the operation of machines and working with their hands, are paid hourly based on employer-established work schedules, and do not typically aspire to white-collar managerial roles (Armstrong, 1983) . Since pilots' salaries are a large percentage of an airline's labour costs, which itself accounts for about 30% of airline overheads, managers are motivated to increase control and enhance productivity (Gittell and Bamber, 2010; Harvey, 2007 ). Yet, pilots are often unionized and not afraid to resist by resorting to job action, work-to-rule slowdowns and strikes, like blue-collar workers. However, similar to white-collar professions, pilots' specialized flying skills enable them to work autonomously and enjoy a correspondingly high sense of trust and prestige for which they are well rewarded.
In contrast to professions though, pilots' skills are typically a combination of talent and experience acquired via on-the-job training, military service and operational exposure, not through university programmes such as medical or law school. The expert mantle is conferred informally by peers and reputation, not enforced via oath like doctors. Pilot associations do exist but, unlike medical boards or the lawyers' bar association, their representation is often fragmented and their power is limited particularly during times of merger and restructuring when competing union leadership fights over seniority list integration and work rule changes. Several aviation studies cite a litany of problems with the US airline industry's labour relations system, which remains governed by the antiquated Railway Labor Act of 1926 (Gittell, 2008; Gittell and Bamber, 2010; Gittell et al., 2004 Gittell et al., , 2006 . Researchers note, for instance, deteriorating labour-management relationships have increased the time required to reach labour agreements, which increases employees' frustrations, causing slowdowns and other job action. This, in turn, prompts federal interventions to avoid disruption of the nation's air transportation system as authorized by the Railway Act, and this further antagonizes workers and prompts more job action, further diminishing already low levels of customer trust and satisfaction. Thus when the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a dramatic decline in air travel and loss of billions of dollars in potential airline revenue, managers quickly targeted employees and labour unions -particularly the costly pilot group -seeking to undermine their power and rein in costs, thereby weakening unions' influence further (Gittell et al., 2004; Von Nordenflycht and Kochan, 2003) .
Like doctors and lawyers, the unique nature of pilots' expert skills makes them extremely valuable to employers and difficult to quickly replace. Yet, this expertise is not readily transferrable to jobs outside of the aviation industry and labour unions' strict seniority lists keep pilots beholden to one employer, reducing their job mobility. As a result, rather than pilots' expert skills increasing their marketability, as Gorman and Sandefur (2011) report for expert knowledge workers, pilots' career autonomy is restricted. This makes pilots' expertise a paradoxical mixture of inflight autonomy onboard their aircraft yet groundbased dependency on their airline; a scale that tipped in the post-9/11 period due to managerial control efforts, and the resultant deprofessionalization and work intensification. As areas of expert work have become more diverse, Leicht and Fennell (1997) observe, the means of managing them appear to be converging across work settings as large employers attempt to exert managerial pressure over employees' work in increasingly insidious ways. For instance, an extensive body of literature documents the ways work has become more intense, requiring longer hours in increasingly stressful environments with a decrease in task discretion and autonomy (Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013; Boxall and Macky, 2014; Chesley, 2014; Green, 2004) . Healthcare (Hart and Warren, 2015; Smith et al., 2008) , and to a lesser extent law firms (Devine et al., 2000; Harris, 2002) and academia (Collinson, 2006) have been the focus of several recent work intensification studies. However, few studies have examined the intensification of airline pilots' work from a 'sociology of professions' perspective. Instead, airline studies typically focus on the emotional labour of airline flight attendants and customer service agents (Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Harvey and Turnbull, 2006, 2010; Taylor and Moore, 2015) or workplace gender disparities (Ng et al., 2002; Taylor and Tyler, 2000) . Gorman and Sandefur (2011) stepped outside this occupation-profession debate to introduce a new framework for 'experts', which includes autonomous work based on specialized knowledge within a normative regulating community that enjoys a high sense of prestige, lucrative financial compensation and other rewards. This expert definition is helpful in the current debate because it identifies four ways that employees' work can change: restricted autonomy, disrespected expertise, loss of community, and declining prestige and associated rewards.
Deprofessionalization of experts
Examining how occupations move towards professionalization has been a popular sociological research topic (McCann et al., 2013; Wilensky, 1974) . However within the last decade of rapid industry restructuring, examining how elite jobs in Western societies can quickly lose their 'expert' status in a process akin to deprofessionalization has been less frequently investigated. By 'deprofessionalization of experts' I mean a process during which an elite field, such as airline pilots, suddenly loses work autonomy through increased managerial control and work intensification during industry restructuring, and suffers a corresponding drop in prestige with reduction in financial compensation and loss of other rewards. In light of these distinctions, a new 'sociology of professions' definition is required which positions pilots in a category between occupation and profession that reflects both the particular characteristics surrounding their expert knowledge and their unique employment vulnerability. As such, I propose a more nuanced category called quasi-professional expert.
Quasi-professional experts are defined as employees who have a unique skill developed through talent and experience which allows them to work autonomously within an organizational structure, and for that they are trusted and well compensated. However, the high cost and weak professional community of quasi-professional experts leave workers vulnerable to managerial cost-cutting agendas during industry restructuring, and new policies and innovations can make their expertise obsolete with little opportunity for employment in other industries.
Background: Aviation history

Deregulation and the decline of unions
The roots of the post-9/11 US airline industry instability can be traced back to 1978 and the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. This legislation was designed to broaden consumer choice and make air travel more affordable by removing government control and opening the market up to competitive forces. Yet, rather than increasing competition, the deregulated environment created an oligopoly still thriving today. In the 1980s, eight air carriers dominated in America, controlling 92% of the market share with monopolies on many routes (Sheth et al., 2007) . In 2015, about 80% of US markets remain dominated by just four air carriers enabling airlines to charge high airfares uncontested (Drew, 2015) .
As airlines gained power in the deregulated environment, aviation labour unions began to lose influence. One of the most notorious labour setbacks occurred in 1981 when about 13,000 federal air traffic controllers walked off the job in a labour strike, demanding wage increases and safer work rules. President Ronald Reagan ordered the strikers back to work, and when they refused, he fired them and hired permanent replacements (McCartin, 2006) . Some labour scholars consider Reagan's union busting one of the most significant causes of organized labour decline in the US in the late 20th century (McCartin, 2011) . By strong arming unions and legitimizing use of replacement workers, Reagan authorized companies to adopt managerial practices once considered extreme and destructive (Albrecht, 2004) . Although these strategies emerged before 2001, they became widely accepted as the norm at many US airlines in the post-9/11 period.
Changing managerial ethos
Prior to deregulation, airlines were run by committed industry leaders such as United's Pat Patterson, Delta's CE Woolman and American's CR Smith. These CEOs had respect for aviation as a unique business enterprise and a long-term vision of building a safe airline industry for America. Some were once pilots themselves and spent their entire 30-or 40-year career at one air carrier, taking pride in fostering a family-like community environment, even knowing employees by name, which generated deep-seated loyalties. It was not uncommon to find generations of airline employees throughout their airlines' ranks (Heppenheimer, 1995; Ott and Neidl, 1995; Petzinger, 1995) .
Yet, the deregulated environment attracted a different breed of manager, motivated by different ambitions, who did not share the same commitment to aviation. Many new managers, such as Frank Lorenzo, were not shy about articulating their belief that airline employees were 'overpaid and underworked' (Hopkins, 2000: 11) . In contrast to early CEOs' lengthy tenure at one airline, Lorenzo managed five different airlines over an 18-year career, driving Continental into bankruptcy and Eastern out of business before being banned from the industry (Cohen, 1990) . Similarly, ValuJet Airlines' chairman Lawrence Priddy described his low-cost airline's aspirations: 'Every other start-up wants to be another United or Delta or American. We just want to get rich' (Schiavo, 1997: 8) .
The trend for air carriers to attract professional managers as CEOs with little airline experience or respect for aviation as a unique business enterprise became even more acute in the post-9/11 period. For instance, United's CEO Glen Tilton was a Texaco oil executive before he took United's helm in 2002 and then left for Wall Street just three years later. American's CEO Tom Horton came from telecommunications giant AT&T and joined wireless manufacturer Qualcomm after his airline merged with US Airways in 2002. Northwest's CEO John Dasburg left aviation to run Burger King and his replacement, Richard Anderson, joined health insurer United Health Group after three years. All earned lucrative compensation packages whether their airlines prospered under their leadership or not (Popper, 2012; Sorkin, 2012) .
Shifting expert knowledge
Predictably, post-deregulation airline executives clashed with employees and labour unions over their extreme cost-cutting and inadequate attention to safety (du Gay, 1994 Gay, , 1996 . In the 1990s, intense competition fuelled by CEOs' expansion aspirations and 'economies of scale' theories led to the extensive purchase of new airplanes and record hiring of employees (Fraher and Gabriel, 2014; Petzinger, 1995) . Between 1990 and 2000, over 25,000 commercial pilots were hired by major US airlines (see Figure 2 ). This rapid industry expansion exhausted the supply of military trained and college educated pilots and put younger, less experienced pilots in the cockpit of nearly every US air carrier. Airport flight schools sprang up and 90-day commercial pilot training programmes thrived, changing the background and demographics of the professional pilot. It was now possible for someone with no college degree, little aviation experience or proven aptitude, to 'buy' accelerated flight training leading to employment as a regional airline copilot (Fraher, 2012 (Fraher, , 2014 .
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the world's largest pilots' union, notes that after 9/11 major air carriers adopted a new business model that cut costs by parking larger jets and laying off experienced pilots, shifting flying to regional affiliates (ALPA, 2009). For years labour unions like ALPA controlled this practice but after 9/11, with contracts voided by bankruptcy judges, airline management was free to outsource and unions were powerless to intervene. Blyton et al. (2001) observe that it is particularly difficult for aviation unions to protect their members' interests when faced with the threat of outsourcing. As a result, well-paid major airline pilot jobs disappeared post-9/11 and low-paid regional pilot jobs expanded. Perhaps Captain Chesley 'Sully' Sullenberger (2009) said it best when he spoke to Congress after his dramatic Hudson River landing: 'While I love my profession, I do not like what has happened to it.' Blaming 'revolving door management teams who have used airline employees as an ATM', Captain Sully concluded, 'I do not know a single professional airline pilot who wants his or her children to follow in their footsteps.'
Research methods
The present qualitative study is based on empirical materials collected between September 2010 and July 2011 for research investigating the US airline industry. Study participants (N = 127), all captains and co-pilots at US airlines, responded to an online labour union forum inviting them to complete a web-based questionnaire. The survey asked 10 aviation work-related questions, 10 Likert scaled safety-related questions and five open-ended questions. During this early research stage, the aim was not to investigate the deprofessionalization and intensification of pilot work, per se, but rather to surface context-specific changes airline pilots experienced during post-9/11 industry restructuring.
The last survey question asked respondents to provide an email address if they were willing to participate in a follow-on interview. Seventy-two pilots (57%) volunteered to be interviewed, of whom 33 were available during the designated timeframe and completed a semi-structured interview. Ten pilots were interviewed a second time, for a total of 43 interviews. Informed consent was obtained and interviews were recorded, ranging from 41 minutes to two hours and three minutes, creating over 268,000 words of empirical material. An interview guide was used, however interviews were non-directive and informants were encouraged to talk about their careers, families, aspirations, disappointments, and other feelings and experiences.
Participants
All study participants were employed in 2001 as captains and first officers at six different US airlines with a high percentage flying for one of the nation's largest. At the time of the study in 2010-2011, 35% of these pilots remained actively employed at their airline, 46% were involuntarily laid-off, and the remaining 19% had resigned, retired, or elected military leave (see Table 1 ). Informants, referred to here by their pseudonym, ranged in age from 32 to 63 years old, were predominately male (96%), civilian trained (70%) and averaged 23 years of total aviation experience with 13.5 years' flying at commercial airlines and an average of 10,271 flight hours. In sum, they all had significant civilian aviation experience and many years invested in their commercial airline career.
As a former commercial airline pilot and naval aviator, I was able to engage with pilots as a peer, eliciting responses of an honesty and depth that might have been difficult for another researcher. Informants were candid, emotional and reflective in their responses. Feeling conflicted about how their profession had changed, pilots wavered from anger and resentment to sadness and desperation. These were emotions many informants seemed uncomfortable navigating and, at times, our conversation seemed almost cathartic as informants worked through unsettled feelings about workplace changes and, in some cases, their derailed and devalued aviation careers.
Data analysis
I conducted all interviews and transcribed the conversations myself, listening to each audio track several times, which allowed me to become intimate with the empirical material. In addition to facilitating access to this hard-to-reach informant group, my aviation background also helped me de-layer the rich qualitative data the one-on-one semi-structured interviews produced. All transcripts were manually coded in NVivo, a computer software program. To maintain the integrity of the original texts, several readings of the data were undertaken and the codes and sub-codes developed inductively in a process akin to Turner's (1981) seven stages of analysis, which allowed themes to emerge organically from the informant narratives.
My focus became directed towards understanding meaning from the point of view of the informant and the emotion behind their responses helped guide me. I began to see what Gioia et al. (2013: 16) describe as emerging social construction processes, which require the researcher to focus more on the meaning, construction and understanding of informants' experience from their perspective and less on the number and frequency of measurable occurrences. Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003) suggest that focusing on surprises and unanticipated responses is a good methodological rule and effective way to uncover findings that can offer new insights. In sum, my research approach was consistent with the emerging reflexive approach in qualitative enquiry, one in which the researcher seeks to question his or her own values and assumptions, their active role in the fieldwork and the stake they have in the findings and interpretations (Alvesson and Karreman, 2013; Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009; Buchanan and Bryman, 2007; Cunliffe, 2003; Denzin et al., 2006) .
Gradually, themes emerged as important topics to investigate, partly as a result of an encounter with unexpected phenomena. In contrast to established images of pilots as calm, unemotional and fearless individuals as Ashcraft (2005) reported, I found informants' responses were often emotional, irrational and paradoxical. However, instead of seeking to harmonize these inconsistencies, I adopted Alvesson's (2010: 195) recommendation to widen the imagination and consider connections that may not initially be obvious. Gradually, common sub-themes emerged in the rhetoric in nearly every pilot's interview and, cumulatively, these images signalled the overarching themes of deprofessionalization and work intensification as pilots struggled to cope with post-9/11 workplace changes, creating a nearly unanimous sense that the character of their once elite profession had suffered a drastic decline (see Figure 3) .
Limitations of the study
There are several limitations to this study. First, the informant group is small and pilots self-selected to participate. Therefore, the study group is not random. Second, although my airline experience was helpful in gaining access to a difficult-to-reach informant group, gathering the empirical material and analysing its meaning, it is possible my interpretations were influenced by an industry-insider bias. Third, although participants were employed at six US air carriers, a large percentage once worked for one major airline and only 35% remained actively employed at that airline 10 years later. This experience undoubtedly influenced participants' feelings about this employer and potentially their interview responses. That said, increasing parallels among managerial strategies used by US airlines indicate that the findings reported here are not anomalous to one particular air carrier but, in fact, indicative of industry-wide trends. Increasing evidence of these trends continues to emerge. For example, in 2015, federal prosecutors began examining the possibility of collusion among US airlines to limit seating capacity and drive up profits (Drew, 2015) . 
Deprofessionalization and work intensification
The following section represents the key findings reflected in the empirical data and identifies four areas in which US airline pilots experienced deprofessionalization and work intensification after the 2001 industry restructuring, providing examples of the vulnerability of quasi-professional experts.
Pilot-pushing
Nearly all pilots interviewed described a post-9/11 'mood change' as airline managers became 'more of Big Brother', intensifying work by monitoring them in ways that felt demeaning to them as quasi-professional experts and pressuring them to do things that they felt were unsafe; a process called 'pilot-pushing'. For instance, Jose observed, 'When you're being pushed to not call in sick, or being questioned when you call in sick, that's not being safe.' Other pilots provided operational examples of 'pilot-pushing' as well. Aaron explained:
You had to actually refuse to fly the airplane in order for them to get maintenance out to the plane [to fix it]. They wouldn't come out. They wouldn't let you do anything about it unless you said 'I refuse the airplane'. Basically, it felt like 'pilot-pushing'.
Informants reported resisting 'pilot-pushing' by knowing company work rules, federal aviation regulations, labour union contracts and even labour laws. Yet the distinction between legal and illegal was not always clear, as Christopher explained: 'There was greater pressure on the pilots to accept aircraft that were not in a good condition to fly: Legal to fly? -yes; But, safe to fly? -no. ' Anthony described another way airline managers intensified work after 9/11 by pushing pilots to cut costs, challenging their quasi-professional expert knowledge. He said, airline managers 'convinced quite a few captains to not take enough fuel, in my opinion … You know things can change in a moment's notice … Now you're down to minimum fuel and to me that's not very safe … There's just no room for error. ' In addition, interpretations of how strictly to adhere to managerial cost-cutting strategies created conflict among the crew. Anthony provided a compelling example:
We were going to go to Chicago, and from LA to Chicago a lot of things can happen … I said, 'Well, Captain are you going to take a little extra gas?' He said 'Nope, we're taking what's planned.' I said, 'Well, I think we should take a little bit more.' He just looked at me and he said, 'I've heard what you had to say, and I've considered it. If you don't like it, you can get out of the cockpit. Get out of the seat and get out of here.' That's what he said to me! What is important to note in the previous examples is how managerial cost-cutting strategies adopted after 2001 intensified pilots' work, creating conflicts between co-pilots and captains that distracted them from their tasks and undermined their authority and decision-making capacities as experts.
Dan described another cost-saving measure that concerned pilots because of the ways it intensified their work: taxiing the airplane on just one engine to save fuel. Dan said:
After 9/11 we were doing all these 'single-engine taxi outs'. So you have a distracted captain and the co-pilot was starting the other engine, looking inside [running checklists], and the next thing you know it, you are on an active runway. I remember that's happened a couple of times … I was always concerned that sooner or later there was going to be an accident.
The repercussions of fighting back against pilot-pushing were also problematic. Captain Jimmy was fired after refusing to fly an unsafe airplane and has not found another flying job; another example of the vulnerability of quasi-professional experts:
[Pilots] were leaving [my airline] left and right, saying they'd just 'sold their soul'. They were doing things I'd never seen them do. I found out real quickly what they were talking about. If you didn't violate an FAR [Federal Aviation Regulation] for [managers] it was like you became a pariah immediately … Once you've done something that's illegal, and they have it on record that you did, now they hold it over your head.
In addition to managerial policies that challenged pilots' decision-making and undermined their authority, many pilots voiced concerns about post-9/11 training short-cuts designed to save airlines money. Aaron had not flown an airliner in years and was uncomfortable with the training he received:
When we returned [from layoff] post-9/11, training was very compressed. Before I had done the 737 course and it was 6 weeks, when I went back it was 4 weeks. It was very compressed. You really didn't feel that you were getting a deep knowledge. They just wanted to give you enough to pass the test and get out and go fly.
Karen received abbreviated training too: 'Everything in training has been done on the cheap' and 'The testing was a joke, which I just found shocking -that the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] would buy off on that?' Kevin even asked for more training, but it was not provided: 'I was a safe pilot but I was by no means well prepared for my job … It's stunning to me we don't have more safety incidents.'
Fatigue, stress and distraction
In addition to a feeling that, as quasi-professional experts, pilots were being pushed to accept dangerous working conditions, Karen described how work intensification impacted workers' health:
When I came back [from layoff] I was, to be quite honest, shocked at how different the [working] conditions were … It was the most tired I had been in my professional life … I was sick a lot, I'd have bronchitis. I was just kind of always under the weather.
Examples of the repercussions of this fatigue were readily available. Ninety-eight per cent of pilots surveyed witnessed mistakes or distractions on the flight deck because of post-9/11 cost-cutting; 60% saw this on a weekly basis. In response, Doug observed, 'I think it's almost a miracle that there wasn't bent metal and dead people at [my airline].' Similarly, Henry offered:
Stress was certainly an issue. Between people getting furloughed, people having trouble paying their bills, there's financial stress. It put a lot of stress on pilots from a lot of different angles … I went through a divorce. I knew other people who did as well. Personal lives took a real beating.
Stress was not just a factor for the laid-off employees. For both downsized pilots and the remaining survivors, financial unpredictability and working with soon to be unemployed pilots were frequently mentioned as causes of stress and distraction. Captain Jasper recalled, nearly every flight 'I was flying with a co-pilot that was being furloughed either that month or the next month. The stress [was] unbelievable.' And 'when there's stress on one pilot, there's definitely stress on both … It was really obvious to me that at least half of the guys I was flying with were clinically depressed … They really shouldn't have been flying.'
Karen observed how post-9/11 managerial changes had wide-ranging implications even for the senior captains unaffected by the layoffs junior pilots endured:
When I came back from furlough, I'd say at least 50% of all the captains I flew with had gone into some type of side business to supplement their income … They were trying to conduct business while we were on trips, their phones ringing as soon as we hit the ground … It was like everybody was burning the candle at both ends.
Dan provided another example of ways airline pilots' work intensified: 'I flew with one guy who had four or five sandwich franchises in Chicago. The whole trip he was on the cell phone, every little opportunity.' Supporting Karen and Dan's observation, 69% of surveyed pilots reported that they had pursued supplemental sources of income because of post-9/11 pay cuts.
In response to these post-9/11 industry changes and the resultant work intensification, nearly all informants confessed that the passion they once felt for their airline career was gone. Jose initially decided not to return to his airline after layoff, then added: 'The only reason I would go back is for financial reasons -not for the love of flying.' Rather than acquiesce to work intensification, or risk being fired for resisting like Captain Jimmy, some pilots left on their own accord, as Henry described:
I decided to take a voluntary furlough because I didn't like the way things were going. I didn't have confidence that the airline was going to survive. Based on the things they were doing and the people who were running the place, it looked to me like [my airline] was in a death spiral.
Exploitation
Pilots uniformly blamed these industry changes on airline executives who treated their quasi-professional expert knowledge as just another resource to exploit in order to increase shareholder value. As one pilot explained, managers 'are in a completely different world' from rank-and-file employees. 'Managers just care about themselves, not the airlines.' Similarly, Charles recalled: I don't know what business [airline] executives have been in the last five years but I don't think it was the airline business … I don't think these people care. They are only interested in making money -more, more, more money -for themselves and that's all they care about. They really didn't care about the success or failure of the company.
Anthony provided another common observation, 'I blame management, bad management, greedy management … Rather than looking at what's going to make this a great company in the long run, they say what's going to make us a buck today?' Similarly, Captain Gilles emphasized the change in managerial ethos:
I'm afraid for some [managers, air safety] is just a distant connection, and if we should have an accident it's just 'Oh my goodness, that's why we have insurance. That's really unfortunate. Don't take it personally. Let's put a flower on their grave and move on. ' This increase in managerialism created an environment of mistrust and suspicion, and in response, 83% of pilots surveyed reported decision makers leading their airline were 'incompetent'.
Yet, pilots also frequently reported disappointment with their labour union. Aaron explained: 'I felt like I'd been burned by the company, burned by the union. I just wanted to do my job and go home.' Similarly, Karen observed: 'People are way less engaged with the union … They say "Why even bother calling my union rep about this? Nothing will come of it" -a real level of apathy.' Doug noted how for many pilots, union leaders seemed suspiciously 'cut from the same cloth as the CEOs. All these guys are greedy and power hungry … I certainly don't think anybody there has got my best interest at heart.' Tom similarly described his loss of faith in union leadership: Union leaders will sell out their junior members in a heartbeat … The company's there to make a buck [not] to care for you and your career. They are going to do what they can to lower costs … That's what they're there to do -is to make money. I have a bigger problem with the way ALPA has handled things because they are the ones that are supposed to be on our side.
A loss of prestige
Pilots readily described how their work environment -and their attitude towards itchanged between 2000 and 2010, challenging their status as quasi-professional experts. Kevin recalled:
When I was first at [my airline in 1997] I didn't feel like I was at odds with management. I knew there was a labour versus management perspective, but there always appeared to be an ability to work that out. In the last decade, that doesn't seem to be the case … [Airline executives] are just ruthless. They don't care about their employees. They are sold out to a buck. It has become a 'me-versus-you' industry.
Aaron similarly noted, 'Before 9/11, I was always willing to help out the company if they called me and needed a favour. Post-9/11, when I went back [to work from layoff], I was never willing to help out.' Jose explained how his feelings changed, 'Before 9/11 being an airline pilot was a career. After 9/11, it was just a job … I don't have that pride anymore.' Karen followed her father into airline piloting but, she emphasized, that was a time when 'there was an awful lot of legacy families within aviation … [Now, that's] not happening anymore.' Similarly, Raj reported, '[Before 9/11], there was a lot of pride in being an airline pilot … It was a career that people would aspire to … [Now] you would be hard pressed to find anybody who could with good conscience recommend this career. ' This drop in prestige was often mentioned as a particularly shocking change. Karen recalled how when she went looking for a new job during her layoff, smaller aviation companies seemed to revel in major airline pilots' professional decline:
[Other aviation employers] wanted you to be very humble … The idea of all these laid-off airline pilots wanting to come work for them … [They] were almost happy to see these major airline pilots be brought down a peg … Some of them were just awful to me, and there's no doubt they delighted in it. They really wanted you to be apologetic for your background: 'Oh forgive me Father for I have sinned, I swear I'll never be an airline pilot again!'
In contrast to Korczynski's (2007) observation that adverse workplace experiences can lead to communities of coping that increased solidarity, pilots in this study reported developing coping strategies that led to further isolation. Laid-off pilots were particularly challenged by the lack of marketability for their quasi-professional expert skills outside of aviation, as Anthony explained:
The first year [of my layoff] was very rough … I couldn't even get hired at Costco. I remember going to Costco and they said 'Oh, we'll get you on'. And they would never call me.
Jose shared a similar example of how his skills were devalued: I've been applying to, you name it, anything -Target, Walmart, any place. I could not get a job … People don't see you as having anything but technical skills. When you go for an interview, they don't see that you have great leadership skills, great communication skills, great decisionmaking skills, great critical decision-making skills, great teamwork.
Discussion
The research question adopted in this study was to investigate how, if at all, the character of commercial airline pilots' work has been affected by post-9/11 industry restructuring. A secondary aim was to explore why 92% of the pilots surveyed would not recommend an airline career to a young person today. Findings reveal that after 2001, a deprofessionalization process occurred, accelerated by managerial cost-cutting strategies and work intensification agendas, which exploited the particular vulnerabilities of pilots as quasi-professional experts.
First, high labour costs, weak professional communities and managers' ability to make pilots' quasi-professional expert skills obsolete through cost-cutting agendas and policy innovations intensified pilots' work. As operational decision-making became increasingly removed from pilots' jurisdiction due to pilot-pushing, a loss of autonomy occurred with a corresponding relocation of power into the realm of managerial work through policy-making, enabling airlines to achieve considerable control over both the worker and the work itself. This process devalued quasi-professional experts' knowledge, which was an expertise largely developed through personal talent and experience, and no longer deemed critical by professional managers unfamiliar with the intricacies of industry operations.
Second, pilots sought other employment opportunities to supplement their reduced airline income, outside the realm of their quasi-professional expert knowledge. Captains, still employed at airlines, started side businesses and laid-off pilots struggled to gain entry into some of the most basic retail chains. In comparison to lawyers, who might transition into another profession such as politics, NGOs, or policy development, or doctors who might go into research, academia, or public health, pilots reported limited access to other expert work. Instead, without an airplane to fly or airline to work for, pilots quickly transitioned towards blue-collar occupations such as working in construction or driving a taxi. Toren (1975) observes that as once prestigious occupations deprofessionalize the root cause of this transformation can be found in the unique elements of the work itself. To analyse this point further, I revisit Gorman and Sandefur's (2011) definition of 'expert' professions as a framework to explicate further the unique elements of US airline pilots' deprofessionalization process.
Restricted autonomy
The theme underpinning nearly all pilots' rhetoric about post-9/11 workplace changes is an increase in managerial scrutiny and pilot-pushing, and corresponding decrease in pilots' work autonomy; a particular vulnerability of quasi-professional experts. Although Taylor and Moore (2015: 87) reported ways British Airways management tried to institute similar policies to 'gain more control of the aircraft', BA flight attendants reported management 'hadn't succeeded' and instead their actions caused crew to 'stick together' creating a strong sense of 'family' and 'community'. For pilots in the present US airline industry study, this was not the case.
After 9/11, pilots were pushed to fly fatigued, confronted when calling in sick, and scrutinized for requesting that a mechanic fix an unsafe airplane. At some airlines, if pilots resisted this managerial control too strenuously they were fired. This loss of work autonomy significantly accelerated the deprofessionalization process. Disagreements between crews about interpretations and enforcement of post-9/11 managerial costcutting strategies such as lowering fuel reserves and single-engine taxiing often created an adversarial environment. As managers pushed pilots to cut costs, captains and copilots often pushed against each other in disputes over enforcement of new managerial policies, fracturing the pilot group, not creating solidarity as Taylor and Moore (2015) reported.
Disrespected expertise
Expert work requires the creation, communication and application of specialized knowledge (Gorman and Sandefur, 2011) . Pilots flying for major airlines often spend almost a decade developing their quasi-professional expertise either through military service or rigorous civilian career paths. In contrast, regional airlines typically employ entry-level pilots with limited training and experience. As ALPA noted, major airlines outsourced flying to regional air carriers post-9/11, replacing more expensive major airline pilots and their specialized knowledge with inexperienced, less costly regional pilots as a way to reduce labour costs as well as achieve greater control over workers. Although the trend to hire less experienced pilots began in the 1990s as airlines expanded quickly in the deregulated environment, pilot labour unions contained the practice to some extent. After 9/11, with all labour contracts voided by bankruptcy judges, pilot unions lost influence, unable to control the outsourcing and corresponding devaluing of major airline pilots' expertise. Therefore, a central feature in pilots' deprofessionalization process is a lack of respect for their expert knowledge.
Loss of community
There has been a progressive change in the image of the airline as a community ever since early pioneers were replaced by profit-seekers such as Frank Lorenzo. Although this change in managerial ethos was becoming evident prior to 2001, it was exacerbated by the hyper-competitive post-9/11 environment. Today, airline executives are more often professional managers, not experienced aviation industry leaders, viewing airline employees as one more cost to manage, one more resource to exploit; particularly pilots as expensive quasi-professional experts. Taylor and Moore (2015) found that although BA cabin crews became increasingly disillusioned with management in the post-9/11 period, their allegiance to the labour union nonetheless remained strong, and in some cases intensified. Yet, few US pilots in this study responded to workplace changes in this manner. Most US pilots blamed greedy airline managers as well as cannibalistic union leaders for destroying their profession. Similarly, Harvey (2007) notes that UK pilots were more likely to commit to both their airline and union when managers and labour leaders pursued cooperative collectivism, and often blamed both when their partnership broke down. Yet in this US study pilots criticized labour leaders even more than airline executives for post-9/11 workplace concessions. In response, a general apathy about union involvement took over at US airlines. Laid-off pilots reported an increasing sense of isolation and inability to find sympathy for their declining quasi-professional expert status. Several reported their dream career had become just a job; a passionless, instrumental source of income (Fraher and Gabriel, 2014) . Therefore, a third central feature in major airline pilots' sense of deprofessionalization is their loss of community.
Declining status and diminishing rewards
After enduring an average 56% pay cut, loss of pension plans, and, for some, long-term layoff in the post-9/11 period, the high status job many pilots expected to find as quasi-professional experts remained elusive. Images of their industry in a dangerous death spiral were particularly disconcerting for pilots because most expected relatively stable employment and a predictable career path up the seniority ladder to captain. In addition to a lack of stability and financial reward, the daily stress and fatigue of intensified airline flying schedules in the post-9/11 period took a severe toll on pilots' health and family life. The physiological repercussions of this stress and distraction were frequently reported with many pilots voicing surprise that there have not been more accidents at their airline.
Conclusion
The findings of this research suggest that US airline pilots experienced work intensification and deprofessionalization in the decade following 9/11 because of an increase in opportunistic managerial cost-cutting strategies that contributed to a loss of autonomy and discretion over their work, lack of respect for their unique professional knowledge, fragmentation of community and sense of abandonment by their labour union, coupled with a drop in professional prestige and anticipated rewards. Other aviation studies identified similar post-9/11 managerial strategies. For example, Curley and Royle (2013) , Gittell and Bamber (2010) and Harvey and Turnbull (2010) note ways that some European airlines embrace 'low-road' managerialism with aggressive managerial controls that risked alienating staff and jeopardizing safety. Similarly, Blyton et al. (2001) suggest in their study of British Airways that a deterioration in labour relations may be a price airline executives are willing to pay to cut costs and drive up productivity. Yet, few studies have documented the emergence of this 'low-road' managerialism at major US airlines to the extent found here. In addition, although these studies find cabin crew experienced work intensification, job dissatisfaction and declining job security post-9/11, few investigated whether this was prevalent with airline pilots as well.
The fact that nearly every pilot studied would not recommend an airline career to a young person today signals that the examples of work intensification reported here are not atypical of one airline nor just temporary responses to post-9/11 managerialism. Rather, they are examples of the deprofessionalization of airline piloting as an elite career; a process that started with industry deregulation in 1978 and reached fruition in the post-9/11 period. By developing and applying the category of quasi-professional expert, it becomes clear how high cost employees who have a unique skill can become particularly vulnerable to managerial controls. Adopting new policies, work rules and other cost-cutting agendas during industry restructuring, employers can quickly and easily intensify work and devalue quasi-professional experts' specialized knowledge and the unique nature of their skills may leave these experts with little career alternatives or job mobility.
Implications and new research territory
The challenges identified in this study of US airline pilots have application to other industries that employ workers with specialized skills, opening up new territory for future sociology of professions research. To review, the quasi-professional expert conceptual framework comprises five dimensions: (1) a unique skill developed through talent and experience that cannot be taught easily; (2) this skill allows employees to work autonomously within their organization; and (3) for this, they are trusted and well compensated. However, quasi-professional experts' (4) high labour cost and weak professional communities leave them vulnerable to cost-cutting agendas; and (5) the unique nature of their expertise is not easily transferrable to other industries, therefore career options and job mobility are limited.
Several industries outside of aviation could prove promising in terms of potential new areas of quasi-professional expert research. For instance, a study of professional athletes or orchestra musicians investigating the presence and character of the five dimensions described above would prove fruitful. In both examples, the value of athletes or musicians' skills is often temporal and easily influenced by a fickle audience and the predilections of the media and a coach, conductor, owner, or general manager. This year's starting quarterback is next season's free agent. In addition, the rapid pace and unpredictable direction of healthcare and high-tech industry developments present unique workplace challenges in which today's renaissance is tomorrow's obsolescence. Through these examples it becomes clear how influential the context is as a source of expert's vulnerability; an area worth further examination. In addition, future studies might find that new technologies increasingly require that employees narrow their skill sets, restricting the transferability of their expertise to other industries and limiting career options.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
